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Abstract
The  enactive  approach  to  cognitive  science  involves  frequent  references  to 
“action”  without  making clear  what  is  intended by the  term.  In  particular,  no 
definition  or  account  is  offered  of  goals  which  can  encompass  not  just 
descriptions  of  biological  maintenance,  but  the  range  of  social  and  cultural 
activities  in  which  human  beings  continual  engage.  The  present  paper  briefly 
surveys  some  of  references  to  goals  and  goal-directedness  in  the  cognitive 
scientific literature in an attempt draw out an account which might successfully 
fill this gap in theory. Finding no easy answer, some suggestions are made as to 
how such a theory might be developed in the future.
Introduction
We've  been  hearing  a  lot,  recently,  about  how the  mind  is  much  more  active  than  traditional 
cognitive science gives it credit for. Much is being made of how the mind should best be understood 
as  dynamically  embodied  –  deeply  and  inextricably  embedded  in  its  environment,  in  constant 
negotiation with context.
Of course, the mind in traditional (computational and representational) theories of mind was never a 
passive thing. It developed, manipulated, transformed and pondered representations from dawn to 
dusk (and mulled over dreams in between). It is the reintroduction of the body that has challenged 
the largely received view of the representational mind – it is the body (and its movements in space 
and its metabolic relationship with the world) that has become much more actively involved in the  
mind than it used to be.
For some, once the body is properly into the picture the need for representations, and the off-line 
computation  that  they  may afford,  is  reduced  or  eliminated.  Representations,  for  these  radical 
embodiment types, need not play a necessary rôle in explanations of cognitive phenomena.  (For 
claims of this kind across cognition generally see Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Maturana & 
Varela, 1987; Thompson, in press. For claims which restrict the anti-representationalist move to the 
more  basic  processes  of  perception  see  O'Regan  & Noë,  2001a;  Noë,  2005.)  This  shifting  of 
emphasis from representation and computation of the right sort  (whatever sort that may be),  to 
behaviour and embodiment of the right sort might smack to some of a return to behaviourism (see 
e.g.  Block  2001).  How can  movement  be  my thinking,  except  insofar  as  that  movement  is  a 
representation or expression of a computation of some sort?
Some proponents of the active mind (the dynamically embodied mind) would defend themselves 
against such criticism by pointing out that the passivity that so plagued behaviourism is nowhere to 
be found in this new take on things. An emphasis not just on behaviour but on action is prevalent  
throughout the various related literatures of the dynamically embodied mind. 
Though a number of related (and in many ways allied) approaches to this embedding of agent in 
context will be mentioned through the course of this paper, It is the enactive approach as outlined 
initially by Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991) and developed in the subsequent literature that is its 
particular focus. The approach begins with a stark acceptance of the mutual dependency between a 
cognitive agent (which must exist in some world) and the world (which can only be perceived or 
conceived by a cognitive agent). The enactive approach as set forth originally in Varela, Thompson 
& Rosch's (1991) The Embodied Mind had five principles. Adapted from Thompson's (in press, p.9) 
summary, these five principles are:
1) Living beings  are  autonomous.  They actively generate  and maintain  themselves,  and in 
doing so “bring forth” their own cognitive domains. This is to say that all cognitive systems 
must be agentive systems, having some capacity to direct and control themselves, in order to 
maintain their own living existence.
2) The nervous system is an autonomous dynamical system. A nervous system is not like a 
symbolic computational system, which accepts information from the “outside world” and 
processes that information in some way. Rather, it is governed by its own internal dynamics 
(the complex tangle of feedback loops between its neurons). Thus, the state of a nervous 
system cannot be determined by external events, it can simply be perturbed by those events, 
and  its  activity  at  any  given  time  is  a  complex  result  of  its  own  activity  and  those 
perturbations.
3) Cognition is the exercise of skillful know-how in situated and embodied action. Cognition 
never occurs in abstraction, but rather in some context which includes not only the agent's 
environment by their own embodiment. Cognition is the adaptive coordination and control 
of actions, but thus cannot be discussed or considered without reference to both the physical 
instantiation of the agent, and that agent's own environment.
4) The world of the agent is not a prespecified external realm, represented internally by the 
agent's  brain,  but  is  a  relational  domain  “brought  forth”  by  the  agent's  autonomy and 
coupling with the environment. This “bringing forth” is also referred to as “sense making”, 
the agent's ability to give meaning to its environment. There is simply no way to specify 
external reality without making at least implicit reference to the perspective, capabilities and 
intentions  of  the  agent.  Any  description  of  the  world  must  always  acknowledge  the 
perspectival nature of any such description.
5) Finally, experience is not a scientific afterbirth, slightly disturbing but ultimately possible to 
ignore  while  the  science  goes  on.  Experience  must,  rather,  play  a  central  rôle  in  our 
understanding of cognition and mind, it must be part of the fundamental data of an adequate 
mind science.
 These principles support a view of the mind-world relationship which gives neither a clear primacy 
over the other. Rather, an agent exists in a world which is “brought forth” or “enacted” by its own 
embodied actions. The world we live in, for instance, has light and sound and texture, but these 
things can only be conceived, perceived and described because there are a range of actions we can 
take to explore those very phenomena, actions both enabled and constrained by the kinds of bodies 
that we have (in fact, the kinds of bodies that we are).
Against possible accusations of behaviourism, an enactive agent does not simply behave, it acts.  
Yes, cognition is tied more closely to behaviour and more wound up in context than traditional 
accounts, but this is not a disempowering relationship. Our agency and autonomy are not threatened 
by such an approach because, under the enactive approach autonomy and agency are  necessary, 
basic requirements for the identity and existence of a cognitive system (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 
1991; see also DiPaolo, Rohde & De Jaegher, in press). The relationship between an agent and its 
world is not one of dominion of the latter over the former (as in behaviourism), but rather one of 
interdependence. Those actions produce distinctions and perceptions which in part create the very 
world in which it lives. This act of creation (termed “bringing forth” or  in the enactive literature) is 
not one of divine creatio ex nihilo, but more similar to our creation of either a pair of faces or a vase 
through an act of perception in the classic  ambiguous figure.  It  is  an emphasis on action (and 
enaction) that saves the enactive approach from being behaviouristic. The behaviours involved in 
enaction are not passive responses to an environment. They are actions which are driven by the 
agent's own autonomy – they are governed by norms rather than by laws of behaviour.
One central implication of adopting the enactive approach is that autonomous action is the key in 
the making of meaning for the agent. Enactivism holds actions as a relational concept, a changing of 
the relation between the agent and the world in some way. Varela et al. (1991) argue that it is the 
autonomous agent's ability to act that underlies sense-making, what they call a “bringing forth” of 
the world. DiPaolo, Rohde & De Jaegher (in press) examine this issue of sense-making in a little 
more depth. They argue that underlying the capacity for sense-making is the creation of value in the 
interaction between the agent and its world. That value cannot be “hard-coded” into the system in 
any  way  (as  a  bald  evolutionary  approach  might  suggest)  as  it  is  in  the  specific  context  of  
individuals, not in the general trends of genetic lineages that these values are expressed. Though a  
particular  behavioural  repertoire  may  have  evolved,  for  example,  to  support  a  group  activity 
(perhaps even to the detriment of the individual), the motivation to perform the actions, the value in 
that specific performance must still arise in the given individual for the action to take place. Many 
evolutionary researchers are not interested in the fact that this value for the individual must occur,  
preferring  to  take  a  gene's  eye  view  which  is  blind  to  the  individual  organism.  As  cognitive 
scientists,  however,  it  behoves us to explain all  behaviour and not just  species-typical patterns. 
While evolutionary history matters, it will not be enough to comprehensively characterise the values 
expressed by individual organisms. To allow the value to be imposed entirely from without the 
agent (e.g. by the evolutionary history of their species) violates the principle of autonomy of the 
enactive approach. They argue that value must emerge dynamically from the embodied interaction 
of the agent with their environment. 
DiPaolo, Rohde & De Jaegher (in press) define value as follows:
the  extent  to  which  a  situation  affects  the  viability  of  self-sustaining  and 
precarious process that generates an identity
DiPaolo, Rohde & de Jaeger, in press, p. 14
with identity being defined as
generated  whenever  a  precarious  network  of  dynamical  processes  becomes 
operationally closed.
DiPaolo, Rohde & De Jaegher, in press, p.5
For DiPaolo et al., values organise and give meaning to the disparate processes that compose the 
agent, and provide a means by which the agent enacts a world. Essentially, value is the implication 
of the environment for the agent.
DiPaolo et al.'s discussion of values, however, remains at a fairly low cognitive level – the level of 
biology (or simulated biology). The emphasis in the literature has been on biological identity, and 
value something to be considered in terms of what will or will not allow an organism to continue 
living  –  a  sparse  implication,  and  one  that  offers  little  of  the  complexity  we  associate  with 
“meaning” at more personal, psychological levels of usage. The term value fits with our intuitions 
of such long-term,  consistent  principles of  activity.  At the so-called higher  levels of  cognition, 
however, the principles governing our activities are much more fluid. What is more, values in the 
domains – psychological, social, cultural – in which these various activities are engaged are subject 
to wide variances and, unlike biological values, are likely to change radically within the lifetime of 
an individual organism. This fluidity and complexity, however, does provide for the possibility of 
both depth and breadth in the implications that more configurable value systems might engender.
We  generally  call  these  values  which  structure  our  actions  over  varying  time-scales  “goals”. 
Whether they govern immediate bodily actions (such as “pick up the cup” or “keeping jogging to 
that next set of traffic lights”) or are more mediate in the execution (“achieve a good career in 
Cognitive Science”), they are our goals, and are habitually drawn on in explanations of people's 
behaviour.
DiPaolo, Rohde & De Jaegher argue strongly that the enactive approach must be developed and 
deployed in our accounts of higher level cognition. Nevertheless their analysis of value is largely 
grounded  in  basic  biological  considerations.  This  largely includes  their  own analysis  of  social 
interaction,  which  advances  the  enactive  approach,  but  mainly  through  the  illustration  of  the 
importance  of  lower  level  embodied  values  in  normal  person  to  person  interaction.  There  is 
certainly no denying the influence of the body and biology on social  interaction.  However,  the 
values that human beings deploy to make sense of their worlds are not always either low-level or 
long-lived. It is a significant characteristic of human beings that our values can and do change 
dramatically from moment to moment,  as our goals change.  Many of our values are  not  to  be 
explained directly in terms of biological homeostasis (or similar concepts), but need to be framed in 
more psychological terms – the terminology, I suggest, of goal-directedness.
The  enactive  approach  does  not  shy  away  from such  terms  (see  the  discussions  of  “intrinsic 
teleology” and agency in Weber & Varela, 2002, or DiPaolo, 2005, for instance). It has not hitherto 
deployed these terms in the higher level psychological domain that I am suggesting it needs to. 
DiPaolo  et  al. (in  press) warn that the enactive approach is  not just  a foundation of embodied 
dynamics upon which to build more traditional, computational or representational accounts of mind. 
The present work seeks to respond to their call to develop the enactive approach across the breadth 
of cognitive scientific endeavour.
Getting into the details of the philosophy of action is beyond the scope of the present paper. By 
defining actions as norm-governed behaviours,  I  seek to  highlight  the idea that actions are  not 
neutral movements or transitions of some system. Rather, they should be understood in terms that 
allow  for  the  distinction  between  success  and  failure  (achievement  or  error),  and  which 
acknowledge the active and interested rôle of the agent (thereby acknowledging the autonomy of 
the agent) in action.
When we talk in common sense terms about action the norms that govern them are our intentions, 
our goals in performing the action. There are a plethora of tangled concepts here, which are the 
subject of significant literatures: intentions, reasons, mental causes, goals, purposes and so forth. 
The enactive literature has generally avoided these “high level” terms, however, in favour of more 
basic conceptions of what a norm might be.
The foundational norm for the enactive approach is that of autopoiesis. Autopoietic is a technical 
term which is used to identify a process (or system of processes) which have as their product their  
own organisation. That is, a system of processes which are organised so that the product of that 
system is the system itself, is an autopoietic system.
Weber & Varela (2002) offer the following definition of an autopoietic system:
An autopoietic system is organized (defined as unity) as a network of processes of 
production (synthesis and destruction) of components such that these components:
1. continuously regenerate the network that is producing them, and
2. constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the domain in which 
they exist
Weber & Varela (2002 p.115)
They argue that autopoiesis provides a basic norm and the basis of teleology. The organisation will  
form a functional boundary in that the recursiveness of the system entails a distinction made by the 
system. That distinction is the distinction between the system itself and its environment (the system 
is a figure against the ground of its environment).
Autopoiesis  is  a  norm  for  an  autopoietic  system  because  the  system  must  either  maintain 
autopoiesis or cease to be a system. It is a very coarse and rather bare norm, a binary choice of  
continuity or disintegration. Nevertheless, the behaviour of the system maintains the system itself 
and thus performs an action – the maintenance of autopoiesis.
What  an  appreciation  of  autopoiesis  provides  is  the  foundation  for  an  understanding  of  the 
relationship between a cognitive agent  and its  world.  But  it  is  only a foundation,  and it  is  the 
bareness of autopoiesis as a norm that concerns me, as it concerned DiPaolo (2005).
Under the enactive  approach, our world is created in our actions, in our maintenance of our identity 
as an autonomous living thing. The behaviours of an autopoietic system are all structured by the  
norm of autopoiesis. DiPaolo (2005) notes, however, that the bareness of autopoiesis, its all-or-
nothing  nature,  does  not  allow  for  the  kinds  of  complexities  of  action,  nor  the  subtleties  of 
sensitivity  that  we  see  in  living  things.  Real  living  things  do  not  simply  live  or  die  but  are  
continually threatened and redeemed, stressed and relieved, they fall ill and recover. Living is not a 
continuous plateau but a constant gauntlet between stasis and disintegration. But bare autopoiesis 
cannot account for such sensitivities. Autopoiesis in its simplest description cannot be threatened or 
healthy – it either is or it isn't. Our actions as living, complex, cognitive agents obey norms that may 
be built on but must be more than autopoiesis.
DiPaolo  (2005)  argues  that  the  ingredient  missing  from  autopoiesis  (Weber  &  Varela's 
characterisation in particular)  is  adaptivity.  In adaptivity a more flexible system can vary in its  
behaviour from the safe to the lethal. With a system capable of such variety (a system not just  
capable of autonomous self-production, but autonomous suicide) we have a more rich and textured 
system not just capable of maintaining autopoiesis but, in a way, capable of appreciating it.
If an autopoietic entity makes a distinction between itself and its environment, an adaptive entity 
makes distinctions between healthy and unhealthy relationships with its environment.
I am far from the first to suggest that we need to consider more carefully the concept of goals in  
dynamical accounts of the mind and action. Dynamical systems researcher Elliot Saltzman (1995) 
has also argued that higher level concepts such as goals should be drawn into our accounts of the 
structure of intentional behaviours. Saltzman has argued that we require not just an account of the 
bodily dynamics of an actor, but the task dynamics. The emergence of successful bodily action is 
not just a product of the bodily effectors and articulators that make up the embodied agent, but 
include the particular demands of the task the agent is trying to achieve. Unlike basic biological 
values, these may vary radically from situation to situation.
Saltzman uses the act of speech production to show that the organisation of the different articulators 
involved,   and  their  responses  to  perturbation,  are  not  just  a  matter  of  biomechanical  or 
neuroanatomic coupling, but are specific to the particular utterance. That is, in addition to bodily 
dynamics, if we are to adequately explain actions we must be able to give a clear description at the 
more abstract level of task dynamics. I will suggest later that a further broad and abstract dynamical 
landscape may be required for explaining human actions.
The  development  of  a  clear  and  mathematically  precise  dynamical  systems  account  of 
psychological processes consistent with the enactive approach is a decades-long commitment and 
beyond the scope of the present work. Nevertheless, if we are to answer the call made by DiPaolo,  
Rohde & De Jaegher (in press) to develop the enactive approach across the breadth of cognitive 
science, then some first steps to providing a framework of a theory of goals will be required. If  
meaning and value are structured not by the world alone, nor by the agent alone, but in the higher  
level task dynamics of goal-directed interaction between the two, then an account of human-level, 
person-level meaning must be scaffolded within a framework of goals that encompass such high 
level activity.
Allied Approaches and the Call to Action
Despite its continual reference to action and teleology, the enactive literature to date has not offered 
an explicit and encompassing account of goals and motivation to round out its account of the mind. 
In search of a useful theory to fill this lacuna we might turn to the more mainstream cognitive 
scientific literature where the topic has been given some significant attention. Unfortunately, the 
kinds of view of goals extant are largely inconsistent with the very fabric of the enactive approach.
The most influential conception of goals and goal-directedness in Cognitive Science has been the 
concept of the basic negative feedback regulatory system. Initially introduced as a description of 
purpose by Rosenblueth, Weiner & Bigelow (1943) it was famously expounded and expanded by 
Miller,  Galanter  & Pribram's (1960)  Plans and the Structure of  Behaviour (Miller  et  al.'s  test-
operate-test-exit  components  are  each  effectively  a  single  negative  feedback  circuit).  This 
cybernetic view of goal-directedness has been seen as a very positive thing by cognitive scientists.  
It gives us a mechanistic description of purpose, one which suits well the computational theory of 
mind. Goals can be considered set points maintained (or homed in on) by the feedback system, 
goal-directed behaviour reduced to behaviour governed by such regulatory mechanisms.
This mechanistic view is apparent in more and less explicit forms in a wide variety of popular 
cognitive theories.  From Newell  & Simon's  (1972) classic  (and still  largely dominant)  view of 
problem solving as goal-state representation with the use of operations to reduce the difference 
between that and the present state, to Daniel Wegner's (Wegner & Wenzlaff, 1997) ironic processes 
model of mental control (though the parallels there are mitigated by the negative nature of the ironic 
monitor in Wegner's theory). The cybernetic model is also clear in the domain of personality and 
social  psychology,  where  “idea  selves”  form  the  basis  of  the  feedback  system's  set  point 
(references) and behaviour regulation is considered explicitly in negative feedback terms (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998).
As long ago as 1972, though, Margaret Boden raised concerns with a simple negative feedback 
model of goals. Such a description of goal-directedness does no justice to the forward-driven nature 
of many of our motivations. Boden highlights the poor provisions in a cybernetic model for the 
intensional, perspectival characteristics of motivation which are expressed in such forward striving. 
Rosenblueth et al. (1943) themselves mentioned the possibility of feedforward actions, but only as 
an  aside  in  the  case  of  ballistic  movements  such as  a  snake  striking  at  prey.  With  that  single 
exceptional set of cases, “[a]ll purposeful behavior may be considered to require negative feedback” 
(p.119).
The enactive  approach  shares  Boden's  concerns  (which  have  not,  since  1972,  been adequately 
addressed). More needs to be said about our striving than simply that it  is a negative feedback 
system. Context is demanded in all cases, as to how set points emerge, how the factors involved – 
those proper to  the organism and those imposed by the environment  – interact  to structure the 
behaviour of the agent as actions rather than happenings. What is more, the values in question, for 
reasons noted earlier, cannot be simply hard-wired into the system but must be constructed in the 
operation of the system.
The kinds of descriptions of behavioural regulation and goal-directedness extant in the cognitive 
scientific literature do not, then, offer us an easy solution to the problem of an account of goals for 
the  enactive  approach.  We  must  turn  to  some  other  framework  for  a  scaffold.  Recent  non-
mainstream approaches to mind, related to the enactive approach, have had slightly more to say on 
higher  cognitive  functions.  Might  the embodied  cognition  or  dynamic  sensorimotor  approaches 
offer some help to close this gap in the enactive literature?
Bodies of Thought: The embodiment approach to cognitive science
An emphasis on contextualised, dynamic bodily interaction between an agent and its environment is 
one of the hallmarks of the “embodiment” or “embodied cognition” approach to cognitive science. 
Though the approach is disunified and somewhat diverse, often the key motivation for embodiment 
researchers is the avoidance of abstract, off-line, representationalist descriptions of cognition (e.g. 
Brooks, 1991a,b; vanGelder, 1995). Insofar as it shows the importance of contextualised bodily 
action, embodiment research can often be used to support the enactive view. The concept of action 
as vital almost invariably makes an appearance in such embodied accounts, though action does not 
necessarily play the constitutive rôle that it does in the enactive (and, as we shall see, the dynamic  
sensorimotor) approach.
Andy Clark, one of embodiment's most vocal and prolific proponents, claims the following:
At root, our minds ... are organs for rapidly initiating the next move in real-world 
situations. They are organs exquisitely geared to the production of actions, laid out 
in local space and real time.
Clark, 1997, p.8
Clark notes that in being bodily agents we are primed for bodily action, and our minds have the task 
of  coordinating  that  action.  That  coordination  is  not  the  dictatorial  direction  of  some  central 
executive, however. Rather, our entire bodies exhibit what he refers to as a “problem solving poise” 
(Clark, 2002, p.190), which colours our perceptions and readies our various systems of response. 
Clark offers no clear account of what this “problem solving poise” is, though, and suggests that in 
fact it  might be best considered in terms of more traditional, off-line memory and reasoning. It 
would appear that Clark's “organ for rapidly initiating” actions might be given its parameters of 
operation by a traditional, representational cognitive system that cannot be supported within the 
enactive approach.
Arthur  Glenberg  (1997,  1999)  also  argues  that  the  mind  is  “for”  bodily action,  that  cognitive 
processes are  to guide and support  the performance of real world,  situated activity,  rather than 
abstract or general information processing. The mind is for the controlling of real action in real 
settings but the parameters of control, what is success and what failure, are left implicit. Glenberg 
(1997) suggests that evolution has programmed us correctly, that our valuing of the world is simply 
hard-wired in – all we have to do is put those values to use. But this is unsatisfactory, failing to offer 
us any real explanation of how the individual person, rather than the genetic lineage, appreciates 
such generically defined values. How individuals perceive, interpret and evaluate in a manner that is 
clearly widely variant across individuals just doesn't have an adequate explanation in simplistic 
evolutionary  terms.  Value  and  how  people  draw  meaning  from  their  worlds  must  surely  be 
described at the level of the individual agent, and not the genetic lineage (Collier, 2000).
Gallagher (2005) suggests that the individual agent's goals are fundamental to perception. Similarly 
to  Clark,  he  suggests  that  something  about  our  goal-directedness  structures  and  colours  our 
awareness  of  our  world.  Gallagher  argues  that  such  structuring  is  what  he  calls  “prenoetic”, 
implicit, bodily and prior to consciousness:
The fact that I may feel the object as hot rather than as smooth, for example, will 
depend not only on the objective temperature of the object, but on my purposes. 
Thus physiological  processes  are  not  passively produced by incoming stimuli. 
Rather, my body meets stimulation and organises it within the framework of my 
own pragmatic schemata.
Gallagher, 2005, p.142
Gallagher's  notion of pragmatic schemata,  suggests that how our goals are  structured is  deeply 
implicit, but that they nevertheless enforce some kind of structure on the manner in which the body 
operates. Gallagher, does not offer a worked out account of goals, but reminds us that we must 
conceive of them in terms that are both distributed and bodily, and that basic cognitive processes 
require  them –  our  perception  of  the  world  is  not  just  interpretted  in  light  of  our  goals,  for 
Gallagher, but is structured and constrained á priori by them.
Gallagher's  work  in  collaboration  with  Anthony  Marcel  (Gallagher  &  Marcel,  1999;  see  also 
Marcel, 1992; 2003) raises an important issue that is worth mentioning at this stage. Actions may be 
structured á priori, our goals but those goals come in a variety of scales and their interaction with 
actual  bodily  movement  no  simple  thing.  Marcel's  work  on  the  rehabilitation  of  people  with 
ideomotor dyspraxia. Marcel points out that a number of patients with this difficulty cannot perform 
certain tasks when asked to do so (such as touch their nose, or lift a cylindrical object), but can 
perform them more fluently in more pragmatic  circumstances (such as scratching their  nose or 
lifting a glass to drink). Gallagher & Marcel (1999) identify three levels of personal engagement in  
task, what they call three “intentional attitudes”. The simplest, where the focus is on the movement 
itself, is abstract or decontextualised. Abstract or decontextualised actions are unlikely in the normal 
case,  and are performed purely in order to comply with an explicit  request,  such as in clinical 
assessment. There is no broader goal of which the movement is a part. Lifting an object on the 
request of a clinician would be an example of such a movement. While it is certainly the case that  
abstract  actions  are  contextualised  within  a  form  of  social  context  –  that  of  obeying  the 
experimenter – the action or movement itself is almost immaterial to the event, all that matters is 
that a response be made to the experimenter. 
The second form of intentional attitude are intentions that are pragmatically contextualised. Such 
actions make sense given the immediate personal context of the actor. They involve movements 
which are contextualised by the immediate intentions of the person in question. Lifting a glass to 
take a drink of water is one example – the movement is almost identical to that of lifting the object  
at the request of a clinician, but is contextualised within the individual's personal goals of taking a 
drink and quenching their thirst. 
A third, deeper form of contextual embedding is that of socially contextualised intentional actions,  
which  are  performed not  just  to  satisfy personal  goals,  but  to  take  part  in  cultural  and social  
practices, such as serving drinks to guests.
Marcel (1992) notes that these three forms of intentional attitude often show marked differences in 
fluency and successful performance, the more contextualised the action the better  its execution. 
What is particularly interesting is that normally while other people are present self-consciousness 
often impairs a person's performance. While this is still the case with contextualised actions, when a 
person  is  not  self-conscious but  who's  actions  are  nevertheless  more  richly  integrated  into  a 
pragmatic self, more fluid actions are observed. Examining these issues in greater detail is work for  
another time. What is clear, though, is that understanding how our activities are organised is no 
simple negative feedback system. The dynamics of goal-directedness are more tangled than we 
might like, and although we are developing a more nuanced description of the dynamics involved, it 
remains unclear as to just what a goal is in these cases.
The overall organisation of behaviour by some set of implicit goals is also present in the work of 
Esther  Thelen  and  Linda  Smith  (1994).  They  offer  a  dynamical  systems  perspective  which 
explicitly addresses the individual differences in the development of motor and cognitive function. 
Their taking of a complex systems perspective is a positive one for the enactive view, and highlights 
the  dynamical  “on-going”  nature  of  a  child's  learning  about  their  world,  learning  that  is  not 
preprogrammed but emerges out of the specific interactions between child and their environment. 
Take, for instance, their famous contrasting of the development of reaching in two children, Hannah 
and Gabriel.
Hannah and Gabriel both have quite different behavioural characteristics, what Thelen & Smith 
(1994) refer to in this  context as their  intrinsic dynamics.  Intrinsic dynamics mean that neither 
Hannah nor Gabriel are blank slates in terms of motor movement as they come to learn to reach for  
a given object. Rather, starting from markedly different patterns of behaviour, in order to reach 
successfully  both  must  converge  on  some  basic  reaching  action.  Hannah  they  describe  as 
deliberative and careful in her movements, generally producing slower arm motions. Gabriel, in 
contrast,  produced many energetic arm flappings. The task for both in learning to reach was to 
modulate  their  arm  movements  so  as  to  successfully  make  contact  with  a  desired  object 
(operationally defined as making hand contact with the object while making eye contact with the 
object). Learning to reach for both Hannah and Gabriel were thus quite different tasks, both enabled 
by their bodies (the fact that they had arms in the first place) and constrained by their intrinsic 
dynamics,  which  were  clearly not  controlled  by some central  pattern  generator  of  motion,  but 
involved  the  modulation  of  on-going  patterns  of  activity.  The  patterns  of  adaptation  were 
individually appropriate for each child, given their quite different intrinsic dynamics.
Thelen  &  Smith  (1994)  note  that  the  explanation  of  reaching  requires  more  than  just  the 
embodiment  of  the  children  itself.  The  task  dynamic  description  must  perforce  include  some 
reference to goals, but that goal need not be complex or richly detailed – surprisingly complex 
behaviours  can  be  produced  by  surprisingly  simple  constraints  on  the  dynamics  of  behaviour 
(Thelen & Smith, 1994, p.269). They suggest that goals should be considered as attractors in the 
behaviour phase space which will be just enough to get the self-organising processes of embodied 
action going. 
This analysis of goals is a productive one for the enactive approach. It suggests the beginnings of an 
account of goals which appropriately acknowledges both emergence and embodiment, and which 
avoids the necessity of symbolic representations guiding the whole process. Thelen & Smith (1994) 
offer only the first tantalising hints at a fully developed account, however, their focus in their work 
being the addressing of the processes of development rather that  the construction of value and 
meaning. Nevertheless, their  behavioural attractor model of goals is an important first step. We 
would do well to note, though, that behavioural dynamics will not be able to get us all of the way to 
our goal. The dynamics of embodiment and low-level task demands (such as keeping your eye on 
the target) in actions such as reaching might be enough to describe a task-space such as those called  
for by Saltzman (1995). Nevertheless, this can only be part of the solution – as any fully developed 
account of goal-directedness will need to account not only for how such actions such as reaching 
are performed, but also  why they are performed. In something as simple as reaching, beyond the 
task-dynamics of body, target and intention to reach, is the question of why reaching now, and why 
reach for  that? These are things which require not just a task dynamics (how goals get put into 
practice), but some more like a goal dynamics, how we adopt, revise, drop and achieve, goals. As 
noted above in the discussion of Saltzman's call for task dynamics, it will be beyond the present  
work to develop a precise account of such goal dynamics. Nevertheless, some broad framework 
which might allow us to make headway on the matter is required. 
The work of embodied cognition researchers offer us some suggestions on how our account should 
look, and what constraints we should obey, but no theory of goals is already extant. A second related 
approach to the enactive view, that of dynamic sensorimotor cognitive science, describes cognition 
in terms of skilled action. Might that approach help us define a theory of goals suitable for the 
enactive perspective?
Thought in the Act: The dynamic sensorimotor approach to cognitive science
Often referred to as enactive in the literature, the dynamic sensorimotor approach to the mind is 
nevertheless distinguishable from the enactive view.1 While the approach  has at its heart the claim 
that cognition is the exercise of sensorimotor skills, its proponents often define “skills” in terms of 
“knowledge” or “know-how”, owned, possibly stored and deployed in some way by the brain or 
brain-body system. This is a tad less radical than the enactive approach of Varela, Thompson & 
Rosch (1991) or Thompson (in press).
The most vocal  proponents of a  dynamic sensorimotor approach are Alva Noë (2005; see also 
O'Regan & Noë 2001a,b) and Susan Hurley (1998; see also Hurley & Noë, 2003). The approach 
goes a step further than the more general embodiment view, seeing cognition not simply as action-
oriented  but  as  existing  in  the  action.  More  specifically,  cognition  is  in  the  exercising  of 
sensorimotor skills (the exercising of a mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, see O'Regan & Noë, 
2001a; Noë, 2005). Such an approach is largely compatible with the enactive view, and indeed 
much of the work of dynamic sensorimotor theorists can be plugged into an enactive account with 
little alteration. Insofar as the enactive approach includes the claim that cognition is the exercising 
of sensorimotor skills, then it encompasses (if goes slightly further in its commitments to autonomy 
and reciprocal determinism than) the dynamic sensorimotor view. This also means, however, that 
many  criticisms  levelled  against  the  dynamic  sensorimotor  view  are  also  likely  to  affect  the 
enactive. With these facts in mind, we turn to some of the dynamic sensorimotor theories in order to 
draw out any implications theory may have for a framework for understanding goals.
Probably the most famous of the theories within the dynamic sensorimotor stream of research is 
O'Regan & Noë's (2001a) sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. This seminal 
article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences created waves in Cognitive Science thanks to a confluence 
of important elements. Firstly, the basic message was both clear and radical. Visual perception does 
not  depend upon or even use well  developed internal  representations,  but is  rather  a matter  of 
exercising what they would term “mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingency” (see O'Regan 
& Noë 2001a, p.943 and p.945).  Secondly,  the article  drew upon a host  of empirical  evidence 
supporting the view that vision is an action performed by the agent, not an operation conducted by a 
cognitive module in the brain, or anywhere else. This is a dramatic step away from the received 
view on the psychology of vision, a shift well away from the idea that vision is the result of some 
form of information processing based on input through the eyes. Noë (2005) puts the new approach 
starkly:
The main idea of this book is that perception is a way of acting.
Noë. 2005, p.1
To see is not just to have visual sensations, it is to have visual sensations that are 
integrated, in the right sort of way, with bodily skills.
Noë, 2005, p.4
These “bodily skills” constitute the “mastery of sensorimotor contingencies”. Initially, this view 
might seem to suggest that their account involves some inherent conception of goal-directedness. 
The concept of skill, both in common usage and as it is used by psychologists entails an ability to  
achieve goals in a given domain or situation. However, in both Noë (2005) and O'Regan & Noë 
(2001a), the concept of skill (bodily skill, sensorimotor skill) is defined as a form of knowledge 
(implicit know-how), rather than goal-directed activity. 
It may be queried whether there must always be some goal present for a skill to be deployed. Is it 
not possible for me to recognise food when I am not hungry, for instance? Surely the less committed 
concept of skill as “knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies” is more useful here. But while it is  
certainly  possible  to  recognise  food  without  being  hungry  it  remains  unclear  whether  that 
recognition is taking place outside of any motivational context or goal-directed activity (whether 
that recognition does or does not ultimately depend on some goal-driven activity other than hunger). 
To take a related example, if I stare at my bookshelf for a period of time, I may not be looking for 
anything. In such a state I may be surprised by a particular book that I would like to read, or had 
forgotten I owned. Where is the goal here? We must first answer the question of, where is the  
skilled action? Both the embodiment and the dynamic sensorimotor approach continually remind us 
to be sensitive to the context in which a particular process is occurring. Goals may vary in their 
specificity, as noted in the discussion of Thelen & Smith's work above. What is more, I may have 
more than one motivation at any given time. If I am staring listlessly at my bookshelf, it may be 
precisely to distract myself from work I am having difficulty with, or an attempt to remind myself  
of what books I own. The work of dynamic sensorimotor theorists exhorts us to consider perception 
as a skillful activity (Hurley & Noë, 2003, p.146). It need not be committed to those skills being  
deployed or structured at a given level of description.
Noë (2005) uses the definition of skills as a form of knowledge as one defence against an over-
emphasis on the fine details of the body, what Andy Clark (2002; also Clark & Toribo, 2001) refers 
to as “sensorimotor chauvinism”. Clark claims that O'Regan & Noë's (2001b) statement that their 
approach...
...allows for the possibility (indeed the necessity) that where there are physical 
differences, there are also qualitative differences.
O'Regan & Noë. 2001b p.1013
... commits them to a explanation of vision which is too tightly bound up with the details of the 
bodies of the agents doing the seeing. He suggests that the O'Regan & Noë (2001) must claim that if 
one  person's  eyes  saccade  slightly  fast  than  another's,  then  there  is  by  necessity  a  qualitative 
difference in their consciousnesses. Noë (2005) argues that the emphasis is not on the fine details of 
the body, but on the  sensorimotor knowledge of the agent. Once knowledge of the right kind is 
successfully deployed, then vision (or any other form of perception) is in use.
Other authors have taken issue with O'Regan and Noë's use of the concept of skills as knowledge or 
“know-how”,  however.  Mark  Rowlands  (in  press),  for  instance,  has  criticised  O'Regan & Noë 
(2001a) for drawing on a conception of knowledge without adequately explicating the concept's use 
in this context (after all, what might such practical know-how be, if it is not knowing that of some 
kind, nor dependent on goal-directed activity?). Rowlands argues that we must draw on a new form 
of  representation  in  order  to  sort  out  these  confusions,  but  the  enactive  approach  eschews 
representations as explanatory.
Unfortunately,  the  enactive  approach  cannot  easily  appeal  to  knowledge  as  explaining  what 
perception and cognition might  be either,  precisely because of  its  basic  claim that  cognition is 
skilled activity (Thompson, in press, p.9). Nevertheless, the work of Noë (2005) and O'Regan & 
Noë (2001a,b) remains largely consistent with the enactive approach and we should draw from it 
both encouragement and some direction toward valuable future research in the area. In a search for 
goals, though, it has little to say. More promising, perhaps is some of the work of Susan Hurley.
Hurley's (1997) dynamic sensorimotor approach does not pivot so much on either the pragmatic 
terms “skill” or “knowledge”. Her argument is that the mind, rather than being buffered from the 
world by perceptual processes on the one hand, and behavioural or action processes on the other, is 
constituted  in  a  “dynamical  singularity”  of  complex  feedback  loops.  Some of  these  loops  are 
internal to the organism, but some of them extend into the environment in closer or looser chains of 
causation which characterise the mind. Actions can influence perception non-instrumentally, that is, 
without  that  influence  depending  on  the  actual  alteration  of  the  perceptual  field  by  bodily 
movement. For example, changing the perceptual field by moving the eyes is instrumental, while 
changing a perception by changing one's  intentions is non-instrumental (think of intending to see 
the faces, rather than the vase). As such, the simple distinctions between inside and outside the mind 
based on the parallel distinction between inside and outside the body (or brain, or wherever one 
might take the mind to “reside”) are ill-conceived.
This has some dramatic implications for how we develop a framework for a theory of goals within 
the  enactive  approach.  Hurley's  work  (1997)  exhibits  the  emphasis  on  dynamical  systems  and 
embodied action that characterise the enactive approach, though she does not fully engage with the 
concepts of reciprocal determinism that form the “fundamental circularity”. While her approach is 
thus not fully enactive, it holds some important implications concerning how we might consider 
intentions  and  goals  within  the  enactive  approach.  When  we  draw  on  dynamical  systems 
descriptions of the mind, the tangle of interactions characteristic of cognition are not all contained 
within the skull. Once more, the mind is spread over a wider canvas than intuition might suggest.
Hurley's argument that the mind should be examined as a dynamical system rather than a structure 
with given states suggests, though, that a fully detailed account of goals may not be necessary in 
order  to  explain  the  kinds  of  meaningful  psychological  states  that  we are  interested  in.  In  the 
complex ninth essay of her (1998) Consciousness in Action, Hurley argues for precisely this. In this 
essay Hurley argues that the content of mental states is not fixed by neuroanatomy or states of the 
world, but by the emergent result of interacting constraints. She does not draw on the notion of 
values or intentions  here,  but notes  that  different  sensory channels,  motor  intentions and social 
cognition may give rise to differing accounts of what is going on in the world. If those accounts  
conflict,  there is  pressure to adapt.  This is the case,  for instance,  with perceptual adaptation to 
inverting goggles, where a person's vision adjusts over time in the context of goal-directed actions 
and  conflicting  reports  from other  perceptual  modalities.  The  state  which  Hurley  refers  to  as 
“complete adaptation” is that state where all of these constraints on content are satisfied, and should 
be enough to specify the contents of consciousness.
However, examining Hurley's claim, it should be noted that this “complete adaptation” itself exists 
in a broader context which is worthy of comment. The limits of perceptual adaptation are unclear, 
and just  how completely intentions may adapt  to suit  sensory stimulation would be difficult  to 
assess.  Nevertheless,  that  a conflict  can exist,  that there is  some potential  in  the system which 
“seeks” this state of constraint satisfaction called complete adaptation, needs to be accounted for if 
Hurley's view is to avoid off-loading too much work into the broader causal forces “which explains 
why any subpersonal vehicles of a certain type, or any mental states of a certain type, exist at all” 
(Hurley, 1998, p.7).
Hurley's arguments highlight again the need to address the existence of basic value for a system,  
and  while  it  supports  a  rôle  for  goal-directedness  (for  example,  in  that  intentions  can  affect 
perception non-instrumentally) that rôle remains somewhat vague without a dynamical account of 
goals that would give us a clear picture of why mental contents exist at all. Hurley herself notes that  
Consciousness in Action is not a “full dress development” of her theory, but more a grounding of 
the view and an unseating of the older orthodoxies of the mind, world and their relationship.
The concept of cognition as skilled and dynamic activity is a central one for the enactive approach.  
The work of Noë, Hurley, O'Regan and others is a useful basis from which to develop the idea, as 
their work sets the stage for the conception of higher psychological functioning as skills of the right 
kind. What will clearly be necessary is to try to explicate the concept of skill in a manner more 
immediately amenable to the enactive approach.
Toward an enactive theory of goals
If we are to provide an enactive account of goals and goal-directedness we will need to be in for the 
long-haul. If the enactive approach aims to encompass not just low-level biological and immediate 
bodily  activities,  then  a  framework  which  makes  clear  the  relationship  (more,  the  continuity) 
between basic biological processes such as autopoiesis and more cultural structured activities such 
as “aiming for a good career” needs to be built. Such a framework needs to be able to rationalise the 
relationship between dynamical systems descriptions of behaviour championed by the enactivists 
(along with the embodiment and dynamic sensorimotor theorists) and personal, social and cultural 
processes which are just as much a part of our (human) experience as are straight things, round 
things and red things. This complexity and richness is not a fundamental challenge for the approach 
– any domain in which we are capable of acting we are capable of sense-making for the enactive 
view. It is time to make these more “high level” domains, and the actions which bring them forth,  
explicit.
I am optimistic about such an encompassing enactive account. Conceptual tools are available to 
begin the task. Alicia Juarrero (1999), for example, has argued in favour of a dynamical systems 
account of goals and action which would largely seem commensurate with the enactive approach 
(though  it  is  not  without  its  challenges).  Similarly,  Merlin  Donald's  (1991,  2001)  arguments 
concerning the evolution of the mind make explicit the range of different ways in which we engage 
with our world, from the immediate and basic to the mediate cultural. Like Juarrero's work Donald's 
is  not  without  challenge  for  the  enactive  approach  (his  emphasis  on  different  forms  of 
representation,  for  example,  rather  than  an  emphasis  on  different  forms  of  action),  but  such 
challenges need not be too daunting.  Finally, in addition to the variety of tools already extant in the  
enactive methodologies repertoire – computational modelling (Bourgine & Stewart, 2001; Varela, 
1997; DiPaolo  et al. in press) and neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996; Lutz & Thompson, 2003) 
for instance – we might confidently engage with and deploy the methods of ecological psychology 
(see e.g. Gibson, 1979; Heft, 2001 for a taste of the concepts and methods involved), supporting as 
it does the emphasis on interaction between an agent and their environment. With the proper use of 
such methods and one eye on how it should all fit together in the big picture, enactive research 
should continue to develop in both strength and value.
___________
1 The use of the term “enactive” is likely for two reasons. Firstly, the full implications of Varela et al.'s (1991) entre-
deux often do not seem to be deemed integral to the view. As a result, any approach emphasising action as vitally  
important to our understanding of the mind would seem to qualify as sufficiently “enactive” to warrant the term.  
Secondly, “dynamic sensorimotor” is a mouthful, “enactive” is much snappier. Alva Noë (2005) refers to his theory 
of vision as enactive, but takes care to distinguish his view from that of Varela, Thompson & Rosch. In the hope of 
avoiding confusion, I will refer to Noë's work as dynamic sensorimotor.
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